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INTRODUCTION
Governmentindustrial developmentpolicyhasfocusedonsmall.
and mediumenterprises(SMEs) becauseof.theirefficiencyin the
useof.capital labor.intensity, and resilience to economic_changes.
However,.. S.ME:growth..is' impededby_lim...!ted availability ..and.high
costof.financing, Banksd0.notprovidesu_ficient financing .forSMEs
because !_:ithe.smaj[.i_ .of._ioahsii.limited creditinformation, and
high•r_te,. 0f,,busil_e_'failure_.Governmentconsiders the •banks
supporttoSMEs a;s"inadeCluate foraccelerateddevelopmentof.the
sector.,To increase,supplyof creditto SMEs policymakers•have
resPonded with'tw0typesofapproaches: " ""
1) •directed creditprograms,and
2) legislatedmandatorylendingschemes.
*This paperls based on an evaluationprojectconductedbythe authorsat PSR
DevelopmentConsulting, Inc.Theassistanceof PatriciaCorpuz-Caliiong ofPBSP,
BrunoCornelioand ManuelVillanuevaof USAID_ officersof developmentbanks
involvedin the study,and PDCP In the survey and other data are gratefull_
acknowledged.The studywas conductedbythe authorswith contributions from
FranciscoC, Roble,CarolV. Siapnoand LennieA. Terre,reseamhassistanceof
NoelB.Tamoria,EdwinV.Tanand JosieA. Castillo,and•administrative supportol
LilibethP.Salta. An earlierversionofthispaperwas presentedat the30thAnnual
Meeting of the PhilippineEconomicSociety at the Manila Hotel. The helpful
commentsof participantsinthatworkshopandthisjournarsrefereesare gratefully
acknowledged.2 JOURNALOF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
Research is needed to evaluate the effectiveness of these
approaches in order to improvepolicies towardthe development of
SMEs. This article assesses the efficiency of directed credit
programs and the impact of a liberalized design of a specific credit
program.
Previous Philippine government policies to promote industrial
development are in the natureof "second best" solutions (Bautista,
R., John Power and Associates 1984). Applied to the problem of
developmentin the SMEsector,theseapproaches involvetransfers
from banks as suppliers of credit to SMEs as users of credit.The
ffirst best" approach eliminates distortions that bring about lack of
development of SMEs. "First best" solutions work on the credit
demand of SMEs.However,these policies are made by those with
political power who benefit from the economic distortions. For
example, distortions in the SME sector are caused by policies that
favor big businessoverSMEs, urbanover ruralcitizens, and foreign
exchange users overearners.
On the other hand, "second best" approaches attempt to
increase the supply of creditto SMEs.The government, perceiving
banks as reluctant to lend to SMEs, designs financing programs
directedto meetwhat it perceivesasspecific requirementsof SMEs.
The danger i$that it may allowinefficient SMEs to obtain access to
credit and, at the extreme, lead to self-selection problems. For
example, banks have complained about being induced to make
small unprofitable loansto weak SMEs.A study reportedthat only a
small portion of SMEs are aware of government assistance
programs for small enterprises and that of those, only a small
minority sought or receivedassistance (Hire1984).Those receiving
assistance werefound to be the weaker performers.
Policiesshould be viewed against the backdrop of the state of
the Philippine financial system. The Philippine commercial credit
market is highlysegmented, with commercialbanks lending to large
corporations in Metro Manila and smaller thrift and rural banks
lending to SMEs in the countryside (Salda_la 1988). CommercialSALDANA et al.: LIBERALIZATIONIN CREDITPROGRAMS FOR SMEs 3
banks set higher lending limits and lend from their Metro Manila
head offices and regional units, Their portfolios do not include
significant loans to SMEs outside Metro Manila. By comparison,
private development banks and rural banks can be considered
"community bankers" because they lend to business firms in the
same geographic area where they gather deposits.These banks
are able to lend to SMEs outside Metro Manilabecause they know
the borrowers in their area, and can forego manycredit evaluation
formalities required by commercial banks.
Regulations in the Philippine financial system explain the
segmentation of banks by clientele and geographic service areas.
The difference in capital requirements across bank types account
for larger asset and lending base for commercial banks compared
to thrift banks. Some smallerthrift banks areunableto lend to larger
SMEs because of the constraints imposed on banks by the single
borrower limit (SBL) regulation of the Central Bank. Their limited
size constrains them to lend to the SME market. Banks are also
mandated under a number of laws to lend to preferred sectors, for
example, to beneficiaries of agrarian reform.The residual portfolio
that issubjectto bank managementdecisionisthen allocatedto the
most productive and lower-riskclients.Dueto their reduced amount
of Ioanable funds, banks give priority to the larger and established
business firms.
Directed credit policy intended for the SME sector's
development can be seen within the framework of rent-seeking
theory in development economics. Rent-seeking policy seeks to
counteract the inability of the commercial banking system to
respond to the needs of SMEs, Directed credit is rent-seeking
because the government requires banks to serve SMEs under
terms more favorablethan can be obtained by SMEs in the market.
By increasing the supply of credit to SMEs, government intends to
develop SMEs into larger business firms which can participate in
the commercial credit market.4 JOURNALOF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
ALTERNATIVEDEVELOPMENT FINANCING
POLICIES FORSMEs "
• A second best,environment,as currently,existingfor SMEs,
-requirescreditprogramassistance. The issueiswhetherthe policy
should be designed around directed versus liberalized credit,
specifically:
1) Directed CreditPolicy:Increasing Quantityof Credit UnderPre-
Specified Terms.The current government Policy isto increase
the supply of credit to "target"beneficiaries.by fully specifying
the priceand othertermsand conditions ofthe creditprograms.
The banks' role is practically limited to selecting the SME.
2) Liberalized Credit Policy:ImprovingCreditQuality on Terms. Set
by Transactors.The alternativepolicy.of.emphasizing quality o.f
creditbyallowingpriceand otherterms.Ofcreditto be determined
by.participating financial"institutions (PFIs) and SME&The role
of government is limited to choosing the types of beneficiaries
and other.basic rules,of competition forthe credit program.
, . , ..
Manydirected.creditprograms havebeen structured tOsuit the
policymakers':"perception, on the needs of SMEs. This has led to
credit programs so over-designed and rigid that negative.., results
can. alwaysbe expected, a :priori; ..Itis inherent in rent-seeking
policiesto,aflOw for:special:!acces_ to"reSourcesand/orsubsidies to
move credit to SME& _Long-term :official development assistance
funds arechannelled to banksfor relending..Subsidies are in terms
of loans with below-market:interest.ratesfor the final borrower,,with
below-market pass-on interest rates.by governmentbanks to PFIs
for relending to SMEs; and with financing terms that eliminate the
maturity risk of PFIs.The adverse resultsassociated with subsidies
• are the reduced profitability of governmentbanksadministering the:
programs,the financing ofweaker.SMEs,increased costof auditing
and leakages; and the lack of incentives..forbanks to raisecapitalSALDANA et al.: LIBERALIZATIONIN CREDIT PROGRAMSFOR SMEs 5
for lendingto SMEs.This policycan resultin reducedsupply of long-
term capital for SME lending and increased dependence on
government sources. In short, over-designed credit programs can
initially increase credit to specific SME beneficiaries but inhibit the
long-term supply of credit to SMEs by not providing the proper
incentives.
Liberalized credit policy allows financial institutions and SMEs
to negotiate credit terms and interest rates. It is still rent-seeking
because scarce long-term credit isallocated by government onlyto
"pre-qualified" banks. The pricing and terms of financing are
determined by banks and SMEs in the market. The expected
benefits of market-basedfinancingare in increased profitability and
refinancing of the credit program, the financing of the more
profitable SMEs, reduced cost of monitoring and controls, and
increased incentivesfor banks to refinancethe creditprogram.
The benefits of liberalized policy have not yet been proven in
practice.The govemment has notallowed mostterms ofcredit tobe
determined by transactors because it has perceived that SMEs are
in aweaker bargaining positionrelativeto banks andthat banks are
not channelling •funds to "correct" purposes. These are valid
concerns. Few banks lend to SMEs located outside Metro Manila.
Long-term credit has notbeen availableto SMEs.PFIs mayengage
in internal cross-subsidies, using cheap long-term credit from
program sources for short-term lending at higher interest rates.
Diversion of funds by banks from SMEs to large companies has
been a concem. The governmenthas preferred deliveryof "quality"
credit•throughfinancing of fixed assets rather than workingcapital,
extension of long-term rather than short-term loans, and •giving
priority to smaller rather than larger SMEs. Subsidies have been
justified as a necessary cost associated with SME target
beneficiaries.These•predicted benefits need to be assessed in the
context of a credit programthat usethe liberalized approach.6 .JOURNALOF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
FEATURESOF DIRECTEDSME CREDITPROGRAMS
• .. ., m ..
MajorSMEfinancingprogramswereimplementedforrelending
bybanksand non-bankfinancialinstitutions ....
Amongthespecial.financing programs,the Industrial Guarantee
LoanFund (IGLF).andthe CountrysideLoan.Fund(CLF) had the





1) terms were notflexible;
2) collateral was required;
3) informationon SMEsandtheirprojectsweredeficient and
4) PFIs were notencouragedto increasedepositstosustain the
creditprogram.
Inspecial financingprograms,lendingcriteriaandrequirements•
were pre-specified based on the programs'preconceived methods
for achieving very specific go_als forSME.•development.Anexample.
was the IGLF. It required that loans financenew.fixed assets.
investment1 ,thus defining the-program'sgoal of "S.ME. development"
that ignores business conditions in.some SME areas..lt, matched
the tenor ofthe programloan.tothe•tenorofthe PFI sub-loan to the-
SME. The PFI had no need to mobilize deposits at the end of the
special credit•program's life. In •effect,the program structured the.
loan agreement for the PFI.
•These factors that. constrained the success of special credit
•programs were addressed:in the. design•of an.othe!_...SME ..credit
program, the.SmaltEnterprise.C'mditProgr.am(SECP).
1. Working capitalfinancingis allowed'1o utilizean existingidle factory capacity_'.
a condition which is difficultfor a banker to verify.SALDANAet al,: LIBERALIZATIONIN CREDIT PROGRAMS FOR SMEs 7
FEATURES OFTHE SECP AS A LIBERALIZED
CREDIT PROGRAM
SECP was funded by a grant from the US •government
administered throughUSAID ManilaMission. The SECP was
intended as a wholesalefinancingprogramchannelledthrough
existingfinancialinstitutions. The Philippine•Businessfor Social
Progress (PBSP), a non-profit organization, was chosen to
administer the project. The PBSP accredited 16 private
developmentbanksandaninvestment bankasPFIs.PFIsidentified
qualifiedSMEs. PFIs submittedreportson SMEs for approvalby
PBSP's project committee, which in turn authorized the fund
trustee,•DevelopmentBankofthe Philippines, to releasethe funds
to PFIs.
The SECP was designedas a financingprogramwithliberal
guidelinesand reduced documentationrequirements.It allowed
PFIs flexibilityin loan packaging,allowingthemto processa loan
withintwoweeks.UnderSECP,PFIs hadexclusivediscretionover





The termofindividual PFl•loanstoanSME wasnotrequiredto
bethe same termasthe financingsourceor loanbythe PFI from
the SEC.This was calledthe "portfolio financing"approach.A PFI
was requiredto submita groupof projects(portfolio)forfinancing,
insteadofindividual loans.Whileprojectswereindividually checked
whether they qualifiedunder the Program, the limiton amount
financed and tenor of the loan were calculated based on the
portfolio's totalamountand•average term, •notonindividual projects.
The SECP financedup to 80 percentofthe total•portfolio cost.ASALDA_A et al.: LIBI=RALIZATIONIN CREDIT PROGRAMS FOR SMEs 9
allowed PFIs to be more responsive to the requirements of SMEs
for immediate releases of their loans.
About six months prior to the end ofthe project period, SECP's
total loan fund of P252 millionhad been utilizedthrough drawdowns
and re-availments of P308 million. The average fund utilization
(turnover) was 1.22 times.
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The evaluationof theSECP coveredthree areas,•namely:
1) expansionof creditto SMEs;
2) contribution to$ME growth;and
3) improvementin capacity of PFIs to sustain SME financing
initiatedunderSECP.
The effectivenessof SECP in expandingcredit•toSMEs was
• measuredbythenumberofnewSMEsbrought intotheformalcredit
marketand by the size of SMEs.The efficiencyof.PFI lendingto.
SMEs was measuredbythesizeof the PFI loans.The contribution
of SECP toSME growthwas assessedbytheamountof long-term
financing given to SMEs for investment in fixed assets.
Sustainability wasevaluatedthroughthedepositgenerationpolicies
and performance of .PFIs. The..contribution of SECP to the
• profitability of.pFIs was alsoexamined."
The research methodologytook into accountthe potential
differentialimpactof SECP duetothesizeof the resourcesof PFIs
and of SMEs.Sizeof resourceshasa dominating influenceon the
capacityof PFIs to respondtochangesin the needsof theirSME
clientsand the opportunities offered.byspeciai.financingprojects
•likeSECP. In.fact,the accreditation and.settingof.credit limits.of
PFIs underSECP recognizeddifferences inthe.rangeof.resources
•among PFIs. The resourcesof SME_borrowersdetermine their
capacitytosustaingrowthand remainviableClients of PFIs.10 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
The evaluation approachclassified PFIs into threecategories
based on assets. The cut-off levels ofassets that delimited each
category werebased on perceivedmarket segments of banks.The
categories areas follows:
1) "Group A'PFIs. Large private developmentbanks (PDBs)and
one investmenthousewith assets of P1.0 billionor more.These
PFts havehead offices in MetroManilaand operate in the same
general geographic areas as commercial banks. These PFIs
compete in the marketsegment of commercial banks. They are
referred to as "large" PFIs.
2) "Group B" PFIs. PDBs with assets between P100 million and
P1 billion.These PFIs' credit operations are located outside
Metro Manila.These PDBs.did not compete with commercial
banks and are referredto as "medium-size"PFIs.
3) "Group C" PFIs_PDBs with assets of less than P100 million.
These Pl=ls' credit operations are mainly in their local areas.
Limited resources enabled them to compete only in the lower-
size rangein the creditmarkets.These arereferred to as "small"
PFIs:
The methodology of the study involved a field survey of 14 out
of 17 PFIs anda sample ofabout threeto six SMEs fromeach PFI's
portfolio, adetailed analysis of individual loans from the data bank
at PBSP, a review of the financial statements of all PFIs and
interviews withthe administratorsof SECP.The data bank at PBSP
used in the statistical analysis involved more than 3,250 loan
accounts. Pre-SECP (1988-1989) and post-SECP (1990-!991)
financial data forPFIs wereused with the former as a control group.
Aside from using standard descriptive statistics, two statistical
analysis pro(_edures were applied: multipleregression and analysis
of variance (one-way and two-way,nested).The analysis used five
percent as the alpha for interpreting statistical significance, but,
where a significant relationship was found, the probabilitySALDA_A et al,: LIBERALIZATIONIN CREDIT PROGRAMSFOR SMEs 11
associated with the F-value is shown. The formulation of these
methods are discussedas a statisticalfootnote when they are
initiallyappliedinthispaper.
Subsequentsectionspresentthe resultsof the evaluationof
SECP along the three areas and across the three PFI size
categories.At the end of the evaluationresults,three illustrative
casestudiesare presentedtorelatePFImanagementpoliciesand
PFI performance,Itshowsthat undera liberalizedcreditprogram,
PFI management adjusts its policiesto the opportunitiesand
constraints offered by the financial and SME environment.
Conclusions are summarizedinthe lastsection.
THE IMPACTOF SECP IN EXPANSIONOF CREDITTO SMEs
One of the objectives inruralfinancedevelopmentisto expand
the SME borrowermarketforformalcreditinstitutions. An indicator
of _Nhether a creditprogramwas effectivein creditdeliveryisthe
numberof new borrowe4" SMEs broughtintothe programbyPFIs.
Sincethe risksof lendingtonewborrowers isgenerallyhigher,any
expansionby PFIs of loans to new SME clients indicates their
willingness tosupportSMEsevenataddedrisksandcosts.Results
demonstratethat new SME borrowerswere providedby PFIs with
financingunderSECP,an indication of thequalityof theadditional
loansand expansioninlendingto SMEsunderthe project.
Table 1 shows that new SME borrowersoutnumbered old
borrowersbya ratioof 1.45 to one.Across the three groups,Group
A hadthe highestratioinfavorof newborrowersat 2.4 to one,with
GroupB a closesecondat 1.7 to one. It is interestingto notethat
larger PFIs providedmost of the expansionin number of new
borrower-SMEs whilesmallerPFIskepttotheirexistingloanclients.
Smaller PFIs appeared to be taking in fewer new borrowers
becausetheirlimited resources constrain theircapacitytotakemore
risksandtofundthetotalfinancingrequirements of existingclients.12 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
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Table 1
NUMBER AND AMOUNT OF SECP SUB-LOANS: BY BORROWER
(EXISTING VS. NEW CLIENTS) AND BANK TYPE
(In Million Pesos)
Types of Borrowers PFI Group
(Number and Average
Amountpet Loan) BankA Bank B Bank C Total
New Bank C!ients Number 147 365 189 701
Amount 433 197 i 67 239
Existing Bank Clients Number 62 216 208 486
Amount 768 216 164 264.
Two-way ANOVA 2
Bank Type Borrower Type
F-Ratios: 206.9 8.6
Significance: .001 .01
2. The analysis of variance. (A.NOVA): fixed effects model is about. drawing
inference.regarding the effects of variables. Such effects .are considered a
ref ection of th.e .differerice among population means. The linear model in the two-
way' (i.e., fixed effects of two variables)ANOVA is of the form:
Y_,= m + aj.+ b, +eik + flk
where:
el.Is the effect of variable j (e:g..,.borrower type) and
aj -- mj - m
and.
b,is the effect' of variable k (e.g:, bank type) and
'bk'= mk_m
In this model, the observed value, Y, is seen as the sum offive factors/effects:
population:wide characteristic (m), two variables under study (j andk), the
interaction of j and k, and random error (e). The factor mj is the mean of theSALDANA et al.: LIBERALIZATIONIN CREDIT PROGRAMSFOR SMEs 13
The liquidity provided bySECPallowedthem toincrease loansonly
to existing clients.
The statistical analysis onthe amount of loansclassified bytype
of borrowerand banks isshown inTable1.The amount of individual
loans to existing clients, regardless of bank type,were significantly
higher. PFIs were more willing to increase their exposure when
dealing with existing accounts. However, the total amount of
portfolios for new clients was higher across all PFIs because the
number of newclients exceeded old clients.When the type of bank
is considered, a significant concentration of the
larger loans was found in the fewer existing clientsof the largest
PFIs. The interaction effect between PFI type and borrower type
was not significant.
The efficiency of SECP in ensuring increased lending to SMEs
depends on the capacity of PFIs to make small loans at low
servicing cost. The predominant PFIs were development banks
capable of serving SMEs because they had adapted to the SME
population forvariable j while mkis the corresponding mean for variable k, pooled
over the variable J.The grand mean, m, isthe mean of the entire population given
variables j and k (e.g., loan size regardless of bank type and borrowertype). The
random errorterm Ise.kwhile f_is the interactioneffect created bythe combination
of variables j and k. _tatistical significance is set at the 5 percent level for this
study.
Ideally,the experimentaldesignforthe two-way ANOVAshould be orthogonal
topermitseparate estimatesof directand Interactioneffectsofvariables.However,
an orthogonaldesign requiresrandomand independentsamplingand identical
numberof observationsper combinat/onof variables. These Controls arefeasible
to implementunder laboratoryconditionsbut not Underthe social experiment
contextof SECP.The pre-selection ofPFIs fromall possiblePDBs systei:natically
favoredthosecommitted to SMEs.Strictly, the resultsof thestatistical analysisare
limitedto SECP participants. At best,the.conclusionsfromthese resultscanonly
be extendedto other non-participatingfinancial institutions that share this
management bias in favor of financing SMEs. In compensation for .this
shortcoming,the analysisemphasizesthe managementaspectsof the results, in
orderto helpthereaderapplythe resultsof thestudybylookingat thisvariablein
closerdetailinfuturestudiesand policyformulation.14 •JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
segment of the credit market. SME loans were usually small in
amount. By comparison, commercial banks had high minimum
lending limits and served larger business firms with requirements
:like deposits services in multiple branch locations. Policies
restrictingPDB operations constrained their capacity to compete
with commercial banks for large firms. Meanwhile, rural banks had
limited capital to competewith PDBs.
The distribution of loans indicates that the 17 PFIs operated
• mainly in the SMEmarket. FromTable2, about 77 percent of SECP
sub-borrowers were in the middle range.•Only 13 percent of sub-
borrowers took small loans of size associated with rural bank
portfolios. Large sub-borrowers constituted only 10 percent of the
total. PDBs appeared to dominate the SME segment, with
competition from rural banks at the lower end of the loans market
and from commercial banks at the higher end.
I • I II I II
Table 2
SIZE DISTRIBUTIONOF SECP LOANS
BY BORROWERSAND LOAN AMOUNT
(In Million Pesos)
Size (Loan "Type") Borrowers Loan
No. (%) Amount (%)
P5-25,000
("Ruralbank") 167 13 3.1 1
P25;500,000
("PDB") 977 77 152.1 48
Over P500,000
("Commercial bank") 123 10 164.0 51
Total 1267 100 319.2 100SALDAIgAet al.: LIBERALIZATIONIN CREDIT PROGRAMS FOR SMEs 15
Field surveys identified the following reasons why PDBs incur
lower transaction costs, enabling them to makesmall loans:
1) Lower documentation costs due to loan processing based on
interviews, client visits, and familiarity of the banker with the
borrower;
2) Timely decisions made by a few officers; and
3) Reduced formal procedures,and central officesupervision and
audits. •
Thesuccess ofSECP in encouraging PFIsto lend to newSMEs
should•be interpreted against the economic basis of directed credit
-- rent-seeking theory. A rent-seeking approach is economically
justified.when market failure prevents banks from lending to
creditworthy SMEsoKnowing that the Philippine financial system is
segmented, credit programs can channel funds to community
bankers to increase lending to SMEs. The evidenceof SECP
confirming this theory isthat the marketworks in thesame segment
of the financial market and directed credit may not always be a
rational development policy.
SECP'S CONTRIBUTIONSTO SME GROWTH
Developmental Goals of Lending toSMEs
Manyspecial lending programs restrictedloans to the financing
of fixed assets,allowing forworking capital only.inspecial cases or
as part of anSME expansionproject.The intentionwas to use credi{.
fornew capacities that generate newemployment.The•fieldsurvey
showedthat.median loansizesformanufacturingand services were
•larger,implying fixed assetsfinancing, comparedto those in trading
where the financing were for_inventory and operating •expenses.
However, in many areas-in the countrY,opportunities.for capital
expansion are limitedand subjecttohigher risks.Furthermore, local16 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
SME loan markets usually include many undercapitalized SMEs
whose credit needs are for working capital. Directed financing
programs are thus inaccessibleto these SMEso
In contrast, SECP allowedPFIs to-select the type of assets to
be financed by an SME loan. PFIs could have concentrated their
lending to lower-risk working capital financing. The evaluation
results did not show this tobe the case. The distribution of SME
beneficiaries by type of businessactivity isshown in Table3. About
half of SECP loans were usedto finance SMEs involved in trading
while the remainder were allocated to SMEs in services and
manufacturing. There was a balance in the overall allocation of
SECP credit to SMEs in various classes of business. There is no
statisticallysignificantinteraction effectbetween banktype and loan
purpose. Larger banks allocated less for trading compared to
manufacturing and services.Thesmaller banks actually allocated a
better part oftheir oan portfolios for SMEs engaged in trading:
These figures areexplained byfield survey resultsshowing that
smaller PFIs in Group C were located in a market environment
where there were fewer manufacturing activities compared to
II IIII II II III I II • -
• Table 3
DISTRIBUTION OF SECp LOANS BY PURPOSE AND PFI GROUP
(In Million Pesos)
BankType Trading Manufacturing Services Total
Group A 53,4 28.2 37.0 121,4
Group B 55,6 25,7 27.5 112,1
Group C 50.0 • 12.1 23.2 85.7
Total PFI's 159.0 66.0 87.7 319.2
Two-way ANOVA Bank Type Business Type interaction
F-Ratios: 8.40 34.0 0.97
Significance: 0.001 0.001 n.s.SALDANA et al.: LIBERALIZATIONIN CREDIT PROGRAMSFOR SMEs 17.
trading. Further, the accreditationprocess assuredSECP that PFIs
were committed to SME lending, resulting in a wide array and
balanced allocation of uses for credit and types of SMEs served.
Smaller banks couldtolerate less risk,inducinga•priorityfor working
capital financing of SMEs foreasier repayment.
SECP Loans as aTerm Lending Facility
SECP loansclassifiedbytermisshowninTable4, revealinga
coflcentrationin tenorof SECP loanswithinlessthan one-yearto
one to three-yearloans.The amountof loansunderthe long-term
classification (overone year)was over60 percentof the total.The
majorityof the amountof loansunderSECP exceededone year.
There is a statisticallysignificantdifferencein thedistribution of
SECP loans accordingto tenor across all PFIs. The statistical
resultsshowa significantinteraction effectthatthe propensityfor
long-termlendingdependson banktype.LargerPFIsusedSECP
primarilyfortermlending.Due to theirlargerSME markets,itwas
II I
Table 4
DISTRIBUTION OF SECP LOANS BYTENOR AND PFI GROUP
(In Number and in Million Pesos)
T_m of Loan A B C
No. P No. P No. P
1 - 180days 0 0 32 4.3 118 6.4
271 - 360 days 0 0 413 43,:2 152 31,3
1-3 years 118 86,3 174 78.2 114 24,9
TOTAL 222 86,3 642 125.7 416 62.6
Medianloanterm 3 years 1 year 1 year
Two-wayANOVA BankType Tenor Interaction
F-Ratio: 12.3 3.8 2.88
Significance: ,001 .001 .0118 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
feasible for these PFIs to find SME clients and to match loan
maturities to a variety of needs. Larger PFIs, being more liquid,
used internal funds forshort-term lending and SECP forlong-term.
Smaller banks maintained moreshort-term loans but this was not
necessarily "undesirable" because they operated in smaller SME
markets.
Cost Effectiveness in PFI Lending and Loan Size
The capacity of PFIsto service thesmaller loan requirementsof
SMEs depended on their Operatingcost efficiency and resource
constraints, primarily the SBL limitation.The average size of loans
to SMEs was larger for larger PFIs. The distribution of SECP
borrowersby loan size isshown inTable5.The median loan size for
PFIs in Group A was P250,000,with P96,700 and P70,000 for PFIs
in Groups B and C, respectively. Banks preferred larger loans
because they were more cost-effective to. process, price, and
administer. Smaller PFIs could not make larger loans due to SBL
constraints.
Table 5




"Small" 0 1.1 1.7
"Medium" 34.0 72,8 45.4
"Large" 87.5 38.1 38.5
Median loan size P250,000 P96,700 P70,000SALDAIgAet al,: LIBERALIZATIONIN CREDIT PROGRAMS FOR SMEs 19
CAPACITYOF PFIsTO FINANCESME GROWTH
A similarapproachisto examinePFIs in relationto the asset
size oftheirSME borrowers. LargePFIslentto SMEswithmedian
assetsize of P1 million,mediumPFIsofP500,000 andsmallPFIs
ofP250,000.Thetwo-wayANOVAconfirms thestatisticaldifference
among banktypes in the assetsize ofthe SMEsserved.3There was
a significant interaction effectbetweenthe type of bankand the size
ofSME-borrowers. LargePFIsserved largerSMEswhilesmall PFIs
served smaller SMEs. Figure 1 presents a Lorenz curve of SECP
loans by number of borrowers versus amount of loans distributed
according tothe amount of assets of the borrowers.Figure 1shows
that the Lorenz curveofsmall PFIs has the biggest divergencefrom
the 45° degree line compared to those of the medium and large
PFIs. Small PFIs made small loans to many small SMEs which
constituted only a relativelysmall proportion of their total portfolios.
The larger proportion was allocated to a few large SMEs. In
contrast, medium and large PFIs allocated a smaller proportion of
their portfolios to small SMEs and lent to more medium and large
SMEs.
Larger PFIs could meet the credit needs of larger borrowers
because they offered a wide range of bankingservices. In contrast,
smaller PFIs were themselves SMEs in the financial sector. They
were severely constrained in extending continued assistance to
faster-growing SMEs.When these moreprogressiveSMEs outgrew
the limited financing and services capabilities of the smaller PFIs,
they movedout to largerbanks.This was aprocess ofself-selection,
which, in adifferentiatedruralfinancialmarket,couldeventually lead
3.The resultsof a two-wayANOVA( n = 572 loans):
BankType SME AssetSize Interaction.
F-Ratio: 6.9 3.7 2.11
Significance: 0.002 0.001 .0120 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT.
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Figure .1
DISTRIBUTION OFNUMBER OF BORROWERS AND AMOUNT
•OF LOANS BASED ON BORROWER ASSET SIZE
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to smaller PFIs serving the high-risk end of the SME clientele.
Larger PFIs had the resourcesto meet the growingneeds of SMEs.
Sustainability of the Credit Program's Benefits
Special financing programs norrrmlly have limited
implementation periods.PFIsneed to planbeyondthe programto
sustaintheirfinancingofSMEs.The capacityofthe PFIs tosustain
SME lending depends on its performance and policies on the
• generation of deposits. Table 6 shows the average deposits-to-
assets ratio of PFIs. Large PFIs had an average of 55 percent of
assets financed by deposits.The comparisonratiosformedium and
small PFIs were 64 and 32 percent, respectively:The difference in
deposits-to-assets ratioisstatisticallysignificant across banktypes.
Larger PFIs could accumulate larger deposit bases while smaller
PFIs lagged behind in deposits and reliedon borrowings to finance
their assets.
SECP significantly expanded the financing sources of medium
and small PFIs. A substantial proportion of the increase in
borrowing of these banks came from SECP.From Table 6, SECP
financing constituted only3 percent of large PFIs total borrowing in
I I I II ii i
Table 6
DEPOSIT PERFORMANCE OF PFIs (1988-1990)
(In Percent)
BankCType !_eposit SECPLoan Loan
Assets Borrowings Deposits
GroupA 54.9 3.3 90,0
GroupB 63,7 18,1 98.8
GroupC 32.3 72.2 189,6
One-wayANOVA
F-Ratios: 68.8 3.86 7,04
• Significance: ,001 0,05 0.0122 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
1991. For medium and small banks, SECP funds contributed 18
and 72 percent, respectively of these banks' external borrowings.
The statistical analysis shows a significant difference across bank
types due to smaller PFIs, which, as a group, had limited deposits
and could not borrow from Commercial sources. These banks
depended onspecialfinancing programsto fund their asset growth.
Since SECP was a temporary funding source, the smaller banks
faced refinancing problems.Twowaysto address this need are by:
1) deposit mobilization; or
2) shrinkage in the SME portfolio.
SECP borrowings provided PFI management with a target
funding level that had to be replaced largely by new deposits.Such
targets for deposit generation were quite high especially for small
banks, given the constraints these banks faced in the deposits
market. For banks which could not refinance SECP through
deposits, the remaining option was to reduce loans, which meant
that their growth in SME loans could not be sustained.
The financing of loans by deposits is reflected in the loans-to-
deposit ratio in Table 6. The difference in this ratio is statistically
significant across the three PFI groups. Eight of 12 large and
medium banksshowed ratiosof less than 100percent. Small PDBs
lent nearly twice the levelof their deposits, revealinga dependence
on external sources to finance loans. Smaller PDBs would have
difficulties sustaining lending to SMEs because of higher cost of
funds, liquidity pressure from external financing, and high
concentration of large depositors.
SME credit programs were sustainable only if loans to SMEs
were profitable to PFIs.Since SECP re-lending rates to PFIs were
set at market, profitability was not assured. Liberalized conditions
enabled PFIs to modify loan terms and management policies to
make every loan profitable.SALDANA et al.: LIBERALIZATIONIN CREDIT PROGRAMS FOR SMEs 23
A related question is whether the SECP increased the
profitability of PFIs, given that loans to SMEs substantially
increased due to the •program.• The analysis uses a regression•
model relating PFI income with two variables: PFI assets .and an
indicator for pre- and post-SECP."The statistical results indicate a
significantrelationship betweenreturnsandresources.Significance
of the indicator variableimpliesthat SECPincreased the profitability
OfPFts.
Rent-seekingpoliciessuch as subsidizedinterest rates and
"soft-term"loanshavebeenjustifiedbyclaimsthat marketfailure,in
the form of transaction costs, makes small loans to SMEs
unprofitable. SECP's resultsshowthat PFI lendingto SMEs are
profitable becaUse, under the liberalized program, PFIs can
negotiate mutually-beneficial termswith SMEs. High transaction
costs are coveredby marginsacceptableto SME beneficiaries.
PDBs with better familiarity with local borrowers avoid many
substantial costs in documentation and investigationnormally
incurredbycommercialandmulti-branch banks.
4. The rnuHiple regressionmodelisas-follows:
Yp.=.a+ bX_.+ Clj,+ ej..
where:
kisthe return on equity of the jth PFI in year k.
j, is total assetsofthe jth PFI inyear k.
and.
I., is an indicatorvariable that takes the value 0 for year k prior to 1990 and 1
o_herwise forthe jth PFI.
The resultingregressionestimates(dr= 64) are:
b = 4.485E-08 c = 0.0623 a =.0.0581
t = 2.675 t = 2.164 '
Prob. = 0.00948 Prob.= 0.03418
MultipleR = 0.4165 F-ratio= 6.71524 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
Table7
PERFORMANCEOFTHREE PFIS
Performance Data Aeiatrust Bank Bankof Cebu S, Negros Devt.
•Bank
BankData (In millionpesos,Dec.31, 1991)
o Assets 1624.1 ••120.5 78.6
o Loans 898.7 45.7 41.5
o Deposits 1040.2 72.0 33.5
Bank PerformanceIndicators: SECP
1.. Effectiveness ofcreditdeliverytoSMEs
o Medianloansize (P 000s) 1000 87;5 50.0*
o New vs.oldclients • 0.8:1 13.5:1 0.2:1
2. Cor_tributions to SME growth
o Tradingvs. manufacturing/
serviceloans • 4:1 •0.2:•1 5.7:1
o Medianloanterm 3 years f year 1 year*
3. Sustainability (percent,Dec.31. 1991)
o Loans/Deposits 94.0 66.0 168.5
o Increase indeposits/
SECP loan balance
(1990-1991) •5385.0 484.0 124.2
o Returnon shareholders' 21.4 9.2 12.5
equity
°Excludingloansof PIO,O00and less.SALDAIgAet al.: LIBERALIZATIONIN CREDIT PROGRAMS FOR SMEs 25
THREE CASE STUDIES ILLUSTRATINGTHE IMPACTOF SECP
ON BANK MANAGEMENTPOLICIES ANDPERFORMANCE
The impact of SECP for three PFIs are shown in summary
statistics presented in Table 7. The banks' performances were
differentiated by management policies and decisions and market
opportunities. Southern Negros DevelopmentBank (SNDB)was a
small bank that operated in the province of Negros Occidental. In
1984, SNDB reoriented its lending towards SMEs because
management noted that SMEs were more able to cope with the
poor economic conditions at that time andthe bank's SME loan
portfolio had a better collection performance.
SNDB's success in the SME loan market may be attributed to
the following lending policies:
1) Adoption of a simplifiedloan evaluationprocedure that focused
primarily on the proponents' knowledge of their business,
allowing for immediate decisions on credit applications;
2) Personalized approach to loan servicing to enable the bank to
know the client well and respond to their service needs; and
3) Choice of traders as target SME borrowers because they can
afford high interest rates.
The Bank of Cebu(BC)was a medium-sizeddevelopment bank
located in Cebu Citythat had a concentrationof itslending portfolio
in SMEs. BCshifted to SMEs in manufacturing in 1990 after a long
history of lending totrading and commercialbusinesses,apparently
in order to take advantage of ashift inthe economy ofthe Cebu City
area.
Inseeking out SMEsengaged inmanufacturing, the banklinked
up with the Department ofTrade and Industry RegionVII to idenitfy
industries which wereto benefit fromgovernment support and with
local industry associations, like the Cebu Chamber of Commerce,
for client referrals. It also conductedseminars for businessmen26 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
which were intended to present how bank loans could be used to
sustain the growthof the business.The willingness of SME owners
to attend these"loan developmentactivities"wasa criterion used by
BC in loan evaluation. In 1991, BC launched a major financing
program for SMEs and reorganized its credit unit to support the
program.The Bankfound SECP'sflexibleloan conditions to bevery
supportive of its focus towards SMEs. In particular,the SECP was
able to open a new lending window for exporters using
nontraditional securities like letters of credit and purchase orders.
The bank management related itsincreased capacity for such new
types of credit to SECP. Unlike the SNDB which accepted
applications from SMEs with minimum operating experience of five
years, BCfinanced newbusinessesbutcharged ahigh interest rate
(8 to 10 percent above prime) in compensation for the added risk
involved.
The Asiatrust Bankwasthe second biggest SECP participating
bankwhichhad been essentiallyserving MetroManila-based SMEs
since 1960. The SECP provided financing support to lending
activities at its two branches in Cavite and Isabela. Based on the
P1.0 million median loan size of its SECP sub-loans, Asiatrust
appeared to have targeted the larger SMEs. Management
considered SECP as having only a marginal impact on its liquidity
and lending operation, given the size of the bank's resources and
capacity to generate funds. However, management believed that
SECP expanded the Bank's range of loan products which made
banking with Asiatrust attractive to SMEsand other clients.
The three sample banks were financing SMEs primarily
because of their ownfavorable evaluation of the credit-worthiness
and profitability ofthis market.Each ofthe banks had different SME
orientationsinterms ofsize andactivitiesand implementeddifferent
credit policies.The flexibility of the SECP loan terms enabled the
banks to package credit programs for SMEs that were consistent
with their respective profit and risk objectives.The SECP achievedSALDANA et al.: LIBERALIZATIONIN CREDIT PROGRAMS FORSMEs 27
different levels of success in each of the banks as shown by the
: expansion in the number and types of SMEs served.
RESULTSAND CONCLUSIONS
The SECP providedalaboratory,akindofsocial experiment, for
evaluating the results of liberalized credit policy.The SECP pre-
qualified PFIs basedontheir commitmentto SMElending, set credit
limits for PFIs, and defined the purpose and scope offinancing to
end-borrowers. Other terms were set by PFIs and SMEs based on
prevailing market conditionsl The results indicate that the SECP
achieved success in terms of:
1) increased PFI lending to SMEs;
2) the high quality of such increased lending in terms of desirable
development of capacities and new SME credit market;
3) delivery to the SMEs of the financingsuited to their needs; and
4) improved position of PFIs for sustained SME financing.
A significant increase in lending to SMEs was-observed after
the implementation of SECP. New borrowers dominated the
expanded credit provided to SMEs showing the development of a
formal credit clientele under SECP.The increased lendings of PFIs
under SECP were generally acceptable credit risks because the
PFIs selected SMEs which were successful and expanding their
business. The SMEs supported by PFIs were about equally
distributed between trading and manufacturing or services.
The benefits gained by SECP were due to two keyfactors: the
choice of development banks as PFIs and a design that allowed
PFIs and borrowersto negotiate the terms of credit based on their
own profit motives.
Rent-seeking policies justified subsidies and "soft terms" in
credit programs by assumptions of market failure and high
transactions cost.The results of this study cast doubts on whether•. . . ". _." • . . : , • .... . . • . . .
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the SME financing markets actually :failand whether transaction
• costs impede lending .or profitability of PFI loans to SMEs.
Recognizing the segmentation of credit markets, SECP identified
development banks as the "community.bankers"which reachedout
to the SME•market. These.PFIs.hadthe advantage of knowing their
SME clients better, ieadi..ngto.lower transaction costs•for smaller
loans. By reducingdocumentation requirements from PFIs, SECP
ensured .low transactions .costs. The reduced transaction Costs
ultimatelybenefited SMEs the way •direct• interest subsidy did but
without distortions in creditallocation since it was.a reduction of a
deadweight loss. PFIs selected SME projects whose expected
returns met the commercial financing terms and whose riskswere
controlled through prudent loan structuring. SECP.did not:imPede
the pFl's lending•decision Process--from search, loaneva!uation
and approval, loan.structuring to collection. In contrast, other
di_'e.cted, creditschemes did not buildstronger PFIs by creating two
credit approval processes:one forspecial•financingand another for
their own funding.The larger PFIs demonstrated greater capacities
to generate •depositsand to avail of.profit opportunities provided by
SECE. :..
' The SECP.experience shows that the detailed structuring that
character.izedmost.special credit programs may be unnecessary.
When this.isdone adverse results.in terms,of.distortions in credit
allocation can.be expected .evenbefore launchingthe program or.
making.the first loan. Prudent selection of PFIs which serve.the
intended.borrower,segments.. ProVide .the targeting mechanism for
SECP..The Philippines has an uneven .distributionof SMEs in size
and location .a segmented"financial system,. and widely differ ng
states.of economicprogress.outsde MetroMan a By a ow ng each • " : "'". .. "". "'. " .. i "" ' " "
PFI to structure the terms of credit appropriate for each SME and
for business .condtions in the.area,SECP, enabled PFIs..to"cd.ntro "
their risks wh le.continuing .to... provide financing to. SMEs. In..a
second best.setting of underdeveloped financ a .system. , .. .. .. . • , . . • . : •
government provides developmentfinancing to beneficiary sectorsSALDAIgAet al.: LIBERALIZATIONIN CREDIT PROGRAMSFOR SMEs 29
like SMEs. However, the SECP experience indicates that
government should veer away from trying to channel credit toward
specific benefits through detailed program structuring that only
distorts the price of credit.Instead, it should try to get the price and
terms of credit right based more on market forces than on
government intervention.
Lastly, this article presents a behavioral explanation for why
benefits can be achievedundera liberalizedcreditscheme, namely
that banks adjust their management policiesto take advantage of
opportunities for lending to SMEs.A liberalized scheme is superior
to adirected credit programin the wayitchannelsfinancing by PFIs
to developmentally "desirable" purposes and terms based on the
conditions in the PFI market and when they are financially capable
to assume the risks of lending to SMEs. The key advantage of a
liberalized credit program isthe way it gets the price of credit right
by allowing credit terms to be,set bYtransactors who are subject to
the rewards and costs of credit.30 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
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